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The current age of globalization can be
distinguished from the previous one (from 1870
to 1914) by the much higher mobility of capital
than labor (in the previous age. before
immigration restrictions, labor was at least as
mobile as capital). This increased mobility has 1
been the result of technological changes (the
2
ability to move funds electronically). and the
relaxation of exchange controls. The mobility of j
capital has led to tax competition. in which
$
sovereign countries lower their tax rates on
I
income earned by foreigners within their
borders in order to attract both portfolio and
direct investment. Tax competition, in turn,
threatens to undermine the individual and
corporate income taxes, which remain major
sources of revenue (in terms of percentage of
total revenue collected) for all modern states.
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The response of both developed and
developing countries to these
developments has been first, to shift the tax
burden from (mobile) capital to (less
mobile) labor, and second, when further
increased taxation of labor becomes
politically and economically difficult, to cut
government services. Thus, globalization
and tax competition lead to a fiscal crisis
for countries that wish to continue to
provide those government services to their
citizens, at the same time that demographic
factors and the increased income inequality,
job insecurity, and income volatility that
result from globalization render such
services more necessary.
From its beginnings late in the 19th
century, the modem state has been
financed primarily by progressive income
taxation. The income tax differs from other
forms of taxation (such as consumption or
social security taxes) in that in theory it
includes income from capital in the tax
base, even if it is saved and not consumed.
Because the rich save more than the poor, a
tax that includes income from capital in its
base is more progressive (taxes the rich
more heavily) than a tax that excludes
income from capital (e.g., a consumption
tax or a payroll tax). However, the ability to
tax saved income from capital (i.e., income
not vulnerable to consumption taxes) is
impaired if the capital can be shifted
overseas to jurisdictions where it escapes
taxation.
Two recent developments have
dramatically augmented the ability of both
individuals and corporations to earn
income overseas free of income taxation:
the effective end of withholding taxation
by developed countries, and the rise of
production tax havens in developing
countries. Since the United States abolished
its withholding tax on interest paid to
foreigners in 1984, no major capital
importing country has been able to impose
such a tax for fear of driving mobile capital
elsewhere (or increasing the cost of capital
for domestic borrowers, including the
government itself). The result is that
individuals can generally earn investment
income free of host country taxation in any.
of the world's major economies. Moreover,
even developed countries find it
exceedingly difficult to effectively collect

lobalization and tax
com~etition
lead to a fiscal crisis
*
for countries that wish to continue
to provide those government
s e ~ c e to
s their citizens, at the
same time that demographic
and the increased income
inequality, job insecurity, and
income
that result from
globalization render such
more necessary.

and
decade, competition for inbou
01
investment has led an increasin
countries (103, as of 1998) to oIfer rax
holidays specifically geared to foreign
corporate investors. Given the relative ease
with which an integrated multinational can
shift production facilities in response to tax
rates, such "production tax havens" enable
multinationals to derive most of their
income abroad free of host country
,tion.
Moreover, most developed
countries (including the United States)
not dare impose current taxation (or
sometimes any taxation) on the foreign
source business income of their resident
the tax on the foreign income of their
multinationals, for fear of reducing the:{T7
individual residents in the absence of
competitiveness
of those multinational8 ?.
wthholding taxes imposed by host
against mult~nationalsof other countries if
countries, because the investments can be
they did. new multinationals could be set
made through tax havens with strong bank
up as residents of jurisdictions that do not
secrecy laws. Developing countries, with
~
Thus,
much weaker tax administrations, find t h i .pY tax such foreign M U income.
task almost impossible. Thus, cross-border& busin- i n ~ m
a be
dtbroainvestment income can largely be earned
largely free of either host or h m e countr)
free of either host or home country
taxation.
Intel Corporation, a top
t m a t i o ~ $ ~ ~ S'L
~ ~ ~ $ ~ d For
m example:
~
10 multinational, has operations in more
For example, consider a wealthy
than 30 countries around the globe. The
Mexican who wishes to earn tax-free
interest income from investing in the bonds company states that " [aIn Intel chip
developed at a design center in Oregon
of an American corporation. All he needs
might be manufactured at a wafer
to do is set up, for a nominal fee, a
fabrication facility in Ireland, packaged and
Cayman Islands corporation to hold the
tested in Malaysia, and then sold to a
bonds. The interest payments are then
customer
in Australia. Another chip might
made to the Caymans corporation without
be designed in Japan, fabricated in israel,
any U.S. tax withheld under the so-called
packaged and tested in Anzona, and sold
"portfolio interest exemption" (Internal
in China." Specifically, outside the United
Revenue Code section 87 101)).The
States, Intel has malor manufacturing
mdividual does not report the income to
facilities in Pueno hco. China, Malaysia.
the Mefican tax authorities, and they have
the Philippines, Ireland, and Israel. Thus,
no way of knowing that the Caymans
outside
the United States, all of Intel5
corporation is effectivelyan "incorporated
manufacturing
facilities are located in
pocketbook" of the Mexican resident. Nor
countries granting tax hollda~s~
Nor does
are the exchange of information provisions
Intel pay current U . 5 tax on its i ~ ~ c o m e
of the U.S.-Mexico tax treaty of any help,
from those foreign operations, because
because the IRS has no way of knowing
under U.5 law, active income a m e d by
that the recipient of the interest payments
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals
is controlled by a Mexican resident and
is not taxed untll it is repatriated in the
therefore cannot report this to the Mexican
foim of dividends, whch Intel can delay
authorities. As a result, the income is
for inany years. Thus, the effective tax rate
earned completely free of tax (the
o
n Intel's foreign source lncome IS far
Qyrnam, of course, impose no income
below
the nominal US. corporate rate of
taxes of their om).
When we switch our attention from
5 pemnt. ,
passive to producrive in-ent,
a $rmkr
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tax on k b o ~
SeveraE:empirical studies
in ELn mgg=t.eXE that ia xnne develop
jurisdictions the effective tax rate on
incame from ~npiialapproaches zao, and
tax ram on c8pim1 LWC tended m go
d m shmplp since the eady 1980s f w h a
m g ec ~ ~ t m
were
b nWj5As a
-5
cozantrksthat used to mly on the
wvenues b m the income tax are forad ra
incr~asedatheEp regressive ~axes.

Ihe
f a s ~ p * g taxes in OECD
' (Orgmkati8~$for 0rem~rni~Chpratia1;&
and Dwebpmentl m&r w a l i ~ in
a
recent pars have becn ~onxrngtiontaxes
(h
12 percent of taal m u m in 1969
to 18 pemmt in 1995)and papdl taxes

(from 19 percent ro 21 pexem3, both oL
which are morr regmisite than rhe tncome:
' tax. e e r chc b e period, the p e a u ~ i
md c o p m e haxae-meshave not
go
' wnas a pmnmge of total r e m w
' fdhe parsad bmme tax a(c:c~urt.te$
fbr 26
p e m t of total revenues iin E965 and ZT
percent in 1995, while rhc @rm for thc
a q ~ r a f eincome
.
rnare 9 peEene 4$3 .
pmnt respeedveiyl. The
bx menaxe
as a pemmtagc d G D P [ G m Dmwstic
Roducr) tn &v&:Iqigtd
munada wma up
sharply duringrho m e period f f m an
average of 28 p a e a t in X969 lo aknost
40 pesent in f 9%3, md &is increase k

TAX COMPETITION AND THE
OEYELOPING COUNTRIES

The drawbacks sf tax competition for
developed countries are relatively clear.
because such countries have am elaborate
social insurance safety net that requires a
hgh level of government expenditure and
that is threatened by tax competition. But
how does tax competition affect developing
countdes7
Eirst, it should be pointed out that
developing emntfie need the reyenues at
least as much as dewloped countties do, if
not more. A common m i ~ ~ e r c ~ ~ist that
ion
only OECD member countries are
codr~ntedby a h a 1 crisis as a result of
the increasing numbers of elderly people in
the population. lnhct, the increase in
dependency ratios (the ratio of the elderly
to the worki~~opulatiun)
is expected to
take place in other geo'graphic areas as
well, as fertility rates go down and health
care improves. Outside the OECD and the
transition economies, the dependency ratio
starts in the single digits in the 199Qs,bwr
rbes to just below 30 percent by 2 MI.
Mo~over,while outside the OECD md h e
transition economics direct spending on
social insurance is mush 2mer, other form
of govemunent spending ce.g.,government
e m p b ~ e n t ,efiectivety
]
fulfill a social
insurance mle. In Latin h e r b , for
example, direct government spending on
mcid insurance is much lower than
,
indirect spending through government
mnplapent and procurement prqp-ams."
Mare~ver,it seems arang t a . a r p that
dqek~piingcotinaria need tax revenues kss
than developed cmntries because they
b v e less developed social insurance
pr6pm. If one acGep the nonnative
case for social insurance, it appf1es to
developing countries with even greater
force because of vdespread povertyliwtuch
meam that Posing a job can have much
moxe dire consequences. h t the need for
revenus in developing counnies goes lar
kpd social iimme.In some
developing c o u n t r i ~rwmw me needed
to imure Lhe very swvbaE of organired
g m m e n t , as the Russian eqxrience
1
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demonstrates. In other, more stable
developing countries, revenues are needed
to provide for adequate
education (investment in human capital),
which many regard as the key to
promoting development. For example, the
UN has estimated that for only $30-$40
billion, all people in the world can obtain
basic social services (such as elementary
education). Given current trends in foreign
aid, most of these funds have to come from
developing country governments.
Second, the standard advice by
economists to small open economies is that
they should refrain from taxing foreign
investors, because such investors cannot be
made to bear the burden of any tax
imposed by the capital importing country
Therefore, the tax will necessarily be
shifted to less mobile factors in the host
country, such as labor andlor land, and it is
more efficient to tax those factors directly
But while this argument seems quite valid
as applied to portfolio investment, it seems
less valid in regard to FDI (foreign direct
investment, i.e., investment by
multinational enterprises), for two reasons.
First, the standard advice does not apply if
a foreign tax credit is available in the home
country of the investor, which frequently
would be the case for FDI. Second, the
standard advice assumes that the host
country is small. However, an extensive
literature on mu1tinationals suggests that
typically they exist in order to earn
economic rents. In that case, the host
country is no longer "small" in the
economic sense. That is, there is a reason
for the investor to be there and not
elsewhere. Therefore, any tax imposed on
such rents (as long as it is below 100
percent) will not necessarily drive the
investor to leave even if it is unable to shift
the burden of the tax to labor or
landowners.
This argument clearly holds in the case
of rents that are linked to a specific
location, such as natural resources or a
large market. But what if the rent can be
earned in a large number of potential
locations? In this case, the host country
will not be able to tax the rent if the
multinational can credibly threaten to go
elsewhere, although once the investment

situation, which is probably the most
common, would require coordinated action
to enable all host countries to tax the rent
earned within their borders. Some
possibilities for such action are described
below. This relates to the final argument,
which is that host countries need to offer
tax incentives to be competitive. An
extensive literature has demonstrated that
taxes do in fact play a crucial role in
determining investment location decisions.
But all of these studies emphasize that the
tax incentives are crucial given the
availahlity of such incentives elsewhere. Thus,
it can be argued that given the need for tax
revenues, developing countries would in
general prefer to refrain from granting tax
incentives, if only they could be assured
that no other developing country would be
able to grant such incentives.
Thus, restricting the ability of
developing countries to compete in
granting tax incentives does not truly
restrict their autonomy or counter their
interests. That is the case whenever they
grant the incentive only for fear of
competition from other developing
countries, and would not have granted it
but for such fear. Whenever competition
from other countries drives the tax
incentive, eliminating the competition does
not hurt the developing country, and may
aid its revenue raising efforts (assuming it
can attract investment on other grounds,
which is typically the case). Moreover,
under the proposals described below,
developing countries remain free to lower
their tax rates generally (as opposed to
granting specific tax relief aimed at foreign
investors).
Two additional points need to be made
from a developing country perspective. The
first concerns the question of tax incidence.
Since the tax competition that is most
relevant to developing countries concerns
the corporate income tax, it is important to
attempt to assess the incidence of that tax
in evaluating the effects of collecting it on
the welfare of the developing country
Unfortunately, after decades of analysis, no
consensus exists on the incidence of the
corporate tax. While the older studies have
tended to conclude that the tax is borne by
shareholders or by all capital providers,
ggested that the

tax is borne to a significant extent by
consumers or by labor. Another possibility
is that the tax on established corporations
was borne by those who were shareholders
at the time the tax was imposed or
increased, because thereafter it is
capitalized into the price of the shares. It is
unlikely that this debate will be decided
any time soon (in fact, the incidence may
be shlfting over time, especially as
globalization may enable corporations to
shift more of the tax burden to labor).
However, from the perspective of a
developing country deciding whether to
collect taxes from a multinational, three out
of the four possible alternatives for
incidence (current shareholders or capital
providers, old shareholders, and
consumers) are largely the residents of
other jurisdictions, and therefore from a
national welfare perspective the developing
country gains by collecting the tax. And
even if some of the tax is shifted to labor in
the developing country, it can be argued
that as a matter of tax administration it is
more efficient (as well as more politically
acceptable) to collect the tax from the
multinational than to attempt to collect it
from the workers.
Finally, it should be noted that a
developing country may want to collect
taxes from multinationals even if in general
it believes that the private sector is more
efficient in using the resources than the
public sector. That is because in the case of
a foreign multinational, the taxes that the
developing country fails to collect may
indeed be used by the private sector, but in
another jurisdiction, and therefore not
benefit the developing country. One
possible solution, which is in fact
employed by developing countries, is to
refrain from taxing multinationals while
they re-invest domestically, but tax them
upon remittance of the profits abroad.
However, such taxation of dividends and
other forms of remittance is subject to thf
same tax competition problem that we
discussed above. Thus, it would appear
that overcoming the tax competition
problem is in most cases in the interest 01
developing countries, and the question
remains how to do so in the face of the
collective action problem described abovt
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reintroduced the withholding tax on
interest, but made it inapplicable to nonresidents. Non-residents may however, be
Germans investing through Luxembourg
bank accounts. To cope with hproblem,
the Germans have led an EU effort to
introduce a 20 percent withholding tax on
investors from abroad to gain the revenue,
but is afraid that by doing so it would drive
the investors to other jurisdictions that do
not tax them.If there wen: a wiy t
coordinate actions among the relevan
jurisdictions, they all could gain added
revenues without running the risk of losing
A epod illunation df how this dynamic

works is the h s t o l y l G e m taxation of
interat income. 1n11988,
Germany
intr~adwda 10,percent withholding tax
on interesr paid ts bank depositors, but
had to abolish it within a few months
because of the magnitude of capital fli
ta ~ w m b o u r gIn
. 1991, the Eem
Camtitutional Court he1
ding taxes on wag= bug
violated the constiruti~na
The ~wemmentthereunun

United Kingdom have SO far blocked the
adoption of this plan, arguing that it will
lead to a flight of investors to Switzerland
or the United States.
Thus, the key to finding a solution to
the tax competition problem is to attack it
on a broad multilateral basis, though an
organization such as the OECD.Under
current conditions, the OECD is the
natural choice for leading such c o o r h t e d
actions against tax competition, for three
reasons. First, for individual investors to

havens do not oEer adequate investment
opportunities, and deireloping countries are
generally considered too risky for portfolio
investment Cother than through mutual
hnds, which do nut offer tax avoidance
ov~ortunitiesl.Thus. if all OECD members
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the need for tax revenues,
developing countries would in
general prefer to refrain from
granting tax incentives, if only
they could be assured that no
other developing country would be
able to grant such incentives.
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atd be mbject to tax without requiring

Dependmg m h e O E D for solving the
tax campetitim pmb1em su@emfmm one
major drawback Developing countries a=
operatjon from the tax havms.
left out, and may perceive actians by the
Second, about 85 pment of the worlds
nab are headquartered in OECD OECD as a artel of rich countries
operating at their expense. In fact, as
member countries. This is likely to
continue to be the ease for a while, because pointed out above, it is unlikely that tax
competition benefits developing count~ies~
OECD members offer stable corporate and
securities law protection to investors that is who can also use the tax revenues they @ve - ,
up to attract foreign investors. If an
beking in other countries. Thus,if all
- developing countTies could be prevented
O W members agreed on a coordinated
from competing in this fashion, they all
basis to tax their multinationals currently
could gain. But in the longer run, it m y be
on their income from abroad, most of the
better to enuust the fight against harmful
problem of tax competition from direct
tax competition to the W O , in whlch
investment could be solved.
dweloping countries are adequately
Third, the OECD has the required
~ p m e n t e dThis
.
would also solve the
expertise (its model tax treaty is the global
problem of what to do about the 15
smdad) and has already started on the
perrent of multinationals who are not
path of limiting tax competition. In 1998,
headquartered in OECD member countries
it adopted a report entitled Harmfil Tax
(a percentage that can be expected to grow
Cornpetitian. An Emerging Global Issue. This
if the OECD indked moves to resnict tax
report is somewhat limited, because it only
competition for its multinatio&)addresses tax competition for b & l
To sum up: As a result of globalization
activities and services (as opposed to, e.g.,
and tax competition, tax rules can no
Intel!! manufacturing plants). It also does
longer be set by countries acting
not address the taxation of investment
unilaterally or by bilateral tax treaties. In a
income. But it represents an dmmely
useful firststep, and proof that a consensus world in which capital can move k e l y
across national borders and multinationals
can be reached on the tax competition
- are free to choose among many investment
issue. (Switzerland and Luxembourg
locations, the ability of any one country
abstained, but did not dare veto the
(or any two countries in cooperation) to
adoption of the report by the other
27 members of the OECD.)
tax (or otherwise regulate) such capita1 is
The OECD makes a useful dstinction
severely limited. Any such unilateral
between tax competition in the form of
attempt will be undercut by other
generally applicable lower tax rates, and
countries, and will probably not even be
tax regimes designed to attract foreign
attempted in the name of preserving
investors. This distinction is both
national competitiveness. Thus,a
nonnatively and pragmatically sound:
multilateral solution is essential if the
Restricting tax competition should not ana
fundamental goals of taxation or other
cannot mean that voters in democratic
regulation are to be preserved. Private
countries lose their right to determine the
market activities that span the globe can
size of the public sector through general
only be regulated or taxed by organizations
tax incfeases or reductions. But it does
with a similar global reach.
v a n that countries should not provide
windfalls for foreign investors at the
expense of the ability of other countries to
provide those public services their
residents desire. Such limitations are
panicular1y appropriate because those
foreign investors themselves often reside in
cauntries providing a hq& level of services,
and yet refuse to pay the tax price that
providing such services entails.
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